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It is useful to have a criterion for when the predictions of an operational theory should be consid-
ered classically explainable. Here we take the criterion to be that the theory admits of a generalized-
noncontextual ontological model. Existing works on generalized noncontextuality have focused on
experimental scenarios having a simple structure, typically, prepare-measure scenarios. Here, we
formally extend the framework of ontological models as well as the principle of generalized non-
contextuality to arbitrary compositional scenarios. We leverage this process-theoretic framework to
prove that, under some reasonable assumptions, every generalized-noncontextual ontological model
of a tomographically local operational theory has a surprisingly rigid and simple mathematical
structure—in short, it corresponds to a frame representation which is not overcomplete. One con-
sequence of this theorem is that the largest number of ontic states possible in any such model is
given by the dimension of the associated generalized probabilistic theory. This constraint is useful
for generating noncontextuality no-go theorems as well as techniques for experimentally certify-
ing contextuality. Along the way, we extend known results concerning the equivalence of different
notions of classicality from prepare-measure scenarios to arbitrary compositional scenarios. Specif-
ically, we prove a correspondence between the following three notions of classical explainability of
an operational theory: (i) admitting a noncontextual ontological model, (ii) admitting of a positive
quasiprobability representation, and (iii) being simplex-embeddable.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
For a given operational theory, under what circum-
stances is it appropriate to say that its predictions admit
of a classical explanation? This article starts with the
presumption that this question is best answered as fol-
lows: the operational theory must admit of an ontological
model that satisfies the principle of generalized noncon-
textuality, defined in Ref. [1]. Admitting of a generalized-
noncontextual ontological model subsumes several other
notions of classical explainability, such as admitting of a
positive quasiprobability representation [2, 3], admitting
of a locally causal model [4, 5], and being embeddable in
a simplicial generalized probabilistic theory (GPT) [6, 7].
Additionally, generalized noncontextuality can be moti-
vated as an instance of a methodological principle for
theory construction due to Leibniz, as argued in Ref. [8]
and the appendix of Ref. [9]. Finally, operational theories
that fail to admit of a generalized-noncontextual ontolog-
ical model provide advantages for information processing
relative to their classically explainable counterparts [10–
19]. Because the notion of generalized noncontextuality
is the only one we consider in this article, we will often
refer to it simply as ‘noncontextuality’.
While an operational theory simply makes predictions
for the statistics of outcomes in any given experimen-
tal arrangement, an ontological model thereof is an at-
tempt to explain these predictions in a particular way. It
presumes that the systems passing between experimen-
tal devices have properties, and that the complete set of
these properties for a given system, termed its ontic state,
mediates causal influences between the devices. For in-
stance, in the case of an experiment wherein a system
is prepared and then measured (known as a ‘prepare-
measure scenario’), any correlations between the outcome
of the measurement and the choice of the preparation is
to be explained entirely in terms of the dependence of the
ontic state of the system on the preparation procedure
and the dependence of the measurement outcome on the
ontic state of the system. The principle of noncontextu-
ality imposes additional constraints on how experimen-
tal procedures are represented in the ontological model,
and whether or not a given operational theory admits of
a representation satisfying these constraints determines
whether it is classically explainable or not.
Prepare-measure scenarios are the experimental ar-
rangements for which the consequences of generalized
noncontextuality have been most explored. A few works
have also studied experiments where there is a transfor-
mation or an instrument intervening between the prepa-
ration and the measurement [16, 20–24]. However, gen-
eralized noncontextuality has not previously been con-
sidered in experimental scenarios wherein the component
procedures are connected together in arbitrary ways, that
is, in arbitrary compositional scenarios.
In this work, we provide a process-theoretic [25–28]
framework for describing operational theories and onto-
logical models thereof, such that one can represent sce-
narios with arbitrary compositional scenarios. As it ap-
plies to operational theories, our framework is a fairly
straightforward adaptation of existing approaches, such
as those of Refs. [26, 28–30].1 As it applies to ontolog-
ical and quasiprobabilistic models, there are close con-
nections to the works of Refs. [32, 33], which are phrased
more categorically. (Indeed, Ref. [32] influenced our
thinking in early stages of this project.) We also extend
the definition of quasiprobabilistic models of quantum
theory to a definition of quasiprobabilistic models of ar-
bitrary generalized probabilistic theories [29, 30, 34, 35]
(GPTs), as Ref. [32] suggested could be done.
We prove a number of results within this framework,
some of which are extensions of results that have al-
ready been proven for prepare-measure scenarios. For
example, we extend (from prepare-measure scenarios to
arbitrary compositional scenarios) the proof that posi-
tive quasiprobabilistic models are in one-to-one corre-
spondence with noncontextual ontological models [2]. We
also show that the framework of GPTs is recovered when
one quotients an operational theory with respect to op-
erational equivalences (note that in some frameworks,
e.g., Ref. [29], this is essentially taken as the defini-
tion of GPTs). This allows us to extend the result of
Refs. [6, 7]—that every noncontextual ontological model
of an operational theory is in one-to-one correspondence
with an ontological model of the associated GPT—to ar-
bitrary compositional scenarios.
Most importantly, we prove that every noncontextual
ontological model of a tomographically local operational
theory which satisfies an assumption of diagram preser-
vation has a rigid and simple mathematical structure.
In particular, every such model is given by a diagram-
preserving positive quasiprobabilistic model of the GPT
associated with the operational theory, and we prove that
every such quasiprobabilistic model is in turn a frame
representation [3, 36] that is not overcomplete. As a
corollary, it follows that the number of ontic states in
any such model is no larger than the dimension of the
GPT space.
This rigid structure theorem and bound on the number
of ontic states shows that there is much less freedom in
constructing noncontextual ontological models than pre-
viously thought. It also implies new proofs of the fact
that operational quantum theory does not admit of a
noncontextual model and simplifies the problem of wit-
nessing contextuality experimentally.
We now summarize our main assumptions and key re-
sults in more detail.
1 It is also worth noting that the framework presented here is a
precursor to a more novel framework, to be presented in forth-
coming work [31], that is motivated by the objective of cleanly
separating the causal and inferential aspects of operational the-
ories and ontological theories.
3A. Assumptions
The assumptions that are needed to prove our results
will be formally introduced as they become relevant. For
the sake of having a complete list in one place, however,
we provide an informal account of them here. These as-
sumptions can be divided into two categories.
First, we have assumptions limiting the sorts of oper-
ational theories that we are considering.
1. Unique deterministic effect: We consider only
operational theories in which all deterministic ef-
fects (corresponding to implementing a measure-
ment on the system and marginalizing over its out-
come) are operationally equivalent [29].
2. Arbitrary mixtures: We assume that every mix-
ture of procedures within an operational theory is
also an effective procedure within that operational
theory. That is, for any pair of procedures in the
theory, there exists a third procedure defined by
flipping a weighted coin and choosing to implement
either the first or the second, depending on the out-
come of the coin flip.
3. Finite dimensionality: We assume that the di-
mension of the GPT associated to the operational
theory is finite.
4. Tomographic locality: We limit our analysis to
operational theories in which states of a composite
system can be characterized by local tomography,
i.e., by the joint statistics of measurements that are
local to the components.
Second, we have assumptions that concern the onto-
logical model (or quasiprobabilistic model).
1. Deterministic effect preservation: Any deter-
ministic effect in the operational theory is repre-
sented by marginalization over the ontic state of
the system in the ontological (or quasiprobabilis-
tic) model.
2. Convex-Linearity: The representation of a mix-
ture of procedures is given by the mixture of their
representations, and the representation of a coarse-
graining of effects is given by the coarse-graining of
their representations.
3. Empirical adequacy: The ontological (or
quasiproabilistic) representations must make the
same predictions as the operational theory.
4. Diagram preservation: The compositional
structure of the ontological (or quasiprobabilistic)
representation must be the same as the composi-
tional structure of the operational theory.
The most significant assumption regarding the scope
of operational theories to which our results apply is that
of local tomography. Among the assumptions concern-
ing the nature of the ontological (or quasiprobablistic)
model, the only one that is not standard is that of dia-
gram preservation.
As we will explain, however, the assumption of diagram
preservation does not restrict the scope of applicability
of our results; rather, it is a prescription for how one
is to apply our formalism to a given scenario. Further-
more, our main results do not require the full power of
diagram preservation, but rather can be derived from the
application of this assumption to a few simple scenarios:
the identity operation, the prepare-measure scenario, and
the measure-and-reprepare operation. However, full di-
agram preservation is a natural generalization of these
assumptions, as well as of a number of other standard
assumptions that have been made throughout the liter-
ature on ontological models, and so we will build it into
our definitions rather than endorsing only those particu-
lar instances that we need for the results in this paper.
We discuss these points in more detail in Section VII, and
we will provide a defense of full diagram preservation in
a forthcoming paper [31].
B. Results
We collect our main technical results—stated
informally—here. The first result is only novel insofar
as we are proving it as a connection between two
preexisting frameworks, rather than taking it as the
definition of a GPT, and the second result in this list
is only novel insofar as we have extended results known
in the case of prepare-measure scenarios to arbitrary
scenarios. The third and fourth entries in the list are
our primary results, and the expert reader may wish to
skip directly to Section VI, where they are presented.
1. We prove that when one quotients an operational
theory relative to operational equivalences, one ob-
tains a GPT.
2. We prove, for any operational theory, a triple equiv-
alence between:
• a noncontextual ontological model of the op-
erational theory,
• an ontological model of the GPT associated to
the operational theory, and
• a positive quasiprobabilistic model of the GPT
associated to the operational theory.
3. We then prove a structure theorem for representa-
tions of a GPT which implies that:
(a) every diagram-preserving quasiprobabilistic
model of a GPT is a frame representation that
is not overcomplete, i.e. an exact frame repre-
sentation
4(b) every diagram-preserving ontological model of
a GPT is a positive exact frame representa-
tion, and
(c) every diagram-preserving noncontextual on-
tological model of an operational theory is
equivalent to a positive exact frame represen-
tation of the associated GPT.
4. A key corollary of these is that the cardinality of
the set of ontic states for a given system in any
diagram-preserving ontological model is equal to
the dimension of the state space of that system in
the GPT. For instance, a noncontextual ontological
model of a qudit can have at most d2 ontic states.
Similarly, the dimension of the sample space of any
diagram-preserving quasiprobabilistic model is at
most the GPT dimension.
5. Another corollary is that the ontic state space of
a composite system must be the Cartesian product
of the ontic state spaces of the component subsys-
tems. That is, every diagram-preserving ontologi-
cal model satisfies ontic separability.
These results show that by moving beyond prepare-
measure scenarios, the concept of a noncontextual on-
tological model of an operational theory becomes con-
strained to a remarkably specific and simple mathemati-
cal structure. Moreover, our bound on the number of on-
tic states yields new proofs of the impossibility of a non-
contextual model of quantum theory (e.g., via Hardy’s
ontological excess baggage theorem [37]) and dramatic
simplifications to algorithms for witnessing contextuality
in experimental data (e.g. reducing the algorithm intro-
duced in Ref. [6] from a hierarchy of tests to a single
test).
II. DIAGRAMMATIC PRELIMINARIES
In this paper we will represent various types of theories
as process theories, which highlights the compositional
structures within these theories. We will express certain
relationships that hold between these process theories in
terms of diagram-preserving maps. We give a brief in-
troduction to this formalism here. Readers who would
like a deeper understanding of this approach can read,
for example, Refs. [25–28, 31].
A process theory P is specified by a collection of sys-
tems A,B,C, ... and a collection of processes on these
systems. We will represent the processes diagrammati-
cally, e.g.,

f
B
B A
A C
,
C
a
D
E
,
A
c
E
,
B B
b
D

⊂ P, (1)
where we work with the convention that input systems
are at the bottom and output systems are at the top. We
will sometimes drop system labels, when it is clear from
context. Processes with no input are known as states,
those with no outputs as effects, and those with neither
inputs nor outputs as scalars. The key feature of a pro-
cess theory is that this collection of processes P is closed
under wiring processes together to form diagrams; for
example,
f
B B
A
A
C
a
b
c
D
E
D
∈ P. (2)
Wirings of processes must connect outputs to inputs such
that systems match and no cycles are created.
We will commonly draw ‘clamp’-shaped higher-order
processes such as:
τ
A
B
(3)
which we call testers. These can be thought of as some-
thing which maps a process from A to B to a scalar via:
T
A
B
7→ T τ
A
B
. (4)
These are not primitive notions within the framework of
process theories and instead are always thought of as be-
ing built out of particular state, effect and auxiliary sys-
tem. In other words, the tester τ is really just shorthand
5notation for a triple (sτ , eτ ,Wτ ) where:
τ
A
B
=
A
B
sτ
eτ
Wτ . (5)
A diagram-preserving map η : P → P ′ from one pro-
cess theory P to another, P ′, is defined as a map taking
systems in P to systems in P ′, denoted as
S → η(S), (6)
and processes in P to processes in P ′. Taking inspiration
from [38] this will be depicted diagrammatically as
η :: f
B
A
7→ f
η(A)
η(B)
B
A
η
, (7)
such that wiring together processes before or after apply-
ing the map is equivalent, that is:
f
B B
A
A
C
a
b
c
D
E
D
η
η(D)
η(A) η(D)
= f
a
b
c
η
η
η
η
D
B B
B B
A E
A
A C
C E
D
η(D)
η(B)
η(B)
η(E)
η(A) η(D)
η(C)
η(A)
. (8)
We will also use the concept of a sub-process theory,
where P ′ is a sub-process theory of P, denoted P ′ ⊆ P,
if and only if the processes in P ′ are a subset of the
processes in P that are themselves closed under forming
diagrams.
The key process theory which underpins this work is
RLinear, defined as follows:
Example II.1 (RLinear). Systems are labeled by real
vector spaces V where the composition of systems V and
W is given by the tensor product V ⊗ W . Processes
are defined as linear maps from the input vector space
to the output vector space. Composing two processes
in sequence corresponds to composing the linear maps,
while composing them in parallel corresponds to the ten-
sor product of the maps. If a process lacks an input
and/or an output then we view them as linear maps to
or from the one-dimensional vector space R. Hence, pro-
cesses with no input correspond to vectors in V and pro-
cesses with no output to covectors, i.e. elements of V ∗.
This implies that scalars—processes with neither inputs
nor outputs—correspond to real numbers.
If one restricts attention to finite-dimensional vector
spaces, then RLinear is equivalent to the process theory
of real-valued matrices. However, representing the for-
mer in terms of the latter requires artificially choosing a
preferred basis for the vector spaces.
We will also be interested in two theories which are
sub-process theories of RLinear (which, in contrast to
RLinear, do come equipped with a preferred basis).
The first is the process theory of (sub)stochastic pro-
cesses. Here, systems are labeled by finite sets Λ which
compose via the Cartesian product. Processes with in-
put Λ and output Λ′ correspond to (sub)stochastic maps,
and can be thought of as functions
f : Λ× Λ′ → [0, 1] :: (λ, λ′) 7→ f(λ′|λ) (9)
where for all λ ∈ Λ we have ∑λ′∈Λ′ f(λ′|λ) ≤ 1. When
this inequality is an equality, they are said to be stochas-
tic (rather than substochastic). For any pair of functions
f : Λ × Λ′ → [0, 1] and g : Λ′ × Λ′′ → [0, 1] (where the
output type of f matches the input type of g), sequential
composition is given by g ◦ f : Λ × Λ′′ → [0, 1] via the
following rule for composing the functions:
g ◦ f(λ′′|λ) :=
∑
λ′∈Λ′
g(λ′′|λ′)f(λ′|λ). (10)
For any pair of functions f : Λ × Λ′ → [0, 1] and g :
Λ′′×Λ′′′ → [0, 1], parallel composition is given by g⊗ f :
(Λ′ × Λ)× (Λ′′′ × Λ′′)→ [0, 1] via:
g ⊗ f((λ′′′, λ′′)|(λ′, λ)) := g(λ′′′|λ′)f(λ′′|λ). (11)
It is sometimes more convenient or natural to take an
alternative (but equivalent) point of view on this process
theory (e.g., this view makes it more clear that this is
a sub-process theory of RLinear). In this alternative
view, the systems are not simply given by finite sets Λ,
but rather are taken to be the vector space of functions
from Λ to R, denoted RΛ. Then, rather than taking the
processes to be functions f : Λ × Λ′ → [0, 1], one takes
them to be linear maps from RΛ to RΛ
′
, denoted by:
f : RΛ → RΛ′ :: v 7→ f(v) (12)
where for all λ′ ∈ Λ′ we define f(v)(λ′) :=∑
λ∈Λ f(λ
′|λ)v(λ). It is then straightforward to show
that sequential composition of the stochastic processes
corresponds to composition of the associated linear maps
and that parallel composition of the stochastic processes
corresponds to the tensor product of the associated linear
6maps. For example, for sequential composition we have
that for all v ∈ RΛ,
(g ◦ f)(v)(λ′′) =
∑
λ∈Λ
g ◦ f(λ′′|λ)v(λ) (13)
=
∑
λ∈Λ
∑
λ′∈Λ′
g(λ′′|λ′)f(λ′|λ)v(λ) (14)
=
∑
λ′∈Λ′
g(λ′′|λ′)
(∑
λ∈Λ
f(λ′|λ)v(λ)
)
(15)
=
∑
λ′∈Λ
g(λ′′|λ′)f(v)(λ) (16)
= g(f(v))(λ) (17)
Moreover, consider processes with no input—that is, lin-
ear maps p : R→ RΛ. By using the trivial isomorphism
R ∼= R? where ? is the singleton set ? := {∗}, one can
see that these correspond to functions p : ? × Λ → [0, 1]
such that
∑
λ∈Λ p(λ|∗) ≤ 1; following standard conven-
tions, we can denote this as p(λ) := p(λ|∗). So p just
corresponds to a subnormalised probability distribution,
as expected. Similarly, processes with no output, such as
r : RΛ → R, correspond to response functions, that is,
functions r : Λ × ? → [0, 1] such that for all λ one has
r(λ) := r(∗|λ) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, it follows that processes
with neither inputs nor outputs, s : R → R, correspond
to elements of [0, 1], i.e., to probabilities.
Summarizing the above, we have:
Example II.2 (SubStoch). We define SubStoch as
a subtheory of RLinear where systems are restricted to
vector spaces of the form RΛ and processes are restricted
to those that correspond to (sub)stochastic maps.
The second subtheory of RLinear is
QuasiSubStoch, which is the same as the process
theory of (sub)stochastic processes, but where the
constraint of positivity is relaxed. The systems can be
taken to be finite sets Λ, and the processes with input Λ
and output Λ′ can be taken to be functions
f : Λ× Λ′ → R :: (λ, λ′) 7→ f(λ′|λ). (18)
These are said to be quasistochastic (as opposed to qua-
sisubstochastic) if they moreover satisfy
∑
λ∈Λ′ f(λ
′|λ) =
1 for all λ ∈ Λ. The way that these compose and are rep-
resented in RLinear is exactly the same as in the case
of substochastic maps.
Summarizing, we have
Example II.3 (QuasiSubStoch). We define
QuasiSubStoch as the subtheory of RLinear
where systems are restricted to vector spaces of the
form RΛ and processes are those that correspond to
quasi(sub)stochastic maps.
By construction, SubStoch ⊂ QuasiSubStoch ⊂
RLinear. It is known that quantum theory as a
GPT (QT) can be represented as a subtheory of
QuasiSubStoch (see, for example, [32]).
III. OPERATIONAL THEORIES
An operational theory Op is given by a process theory
specifying a set of physical systems and the processes
which act on them (where processes are viewed as lists
of lab instructions), together with a rule for assigning
probabilities to any closed process. A generic laboratory
procedure has an associated set of inputs and outputs,
and will be denoted diagrammatically as:
T
. . .
. . .
A1 An
B1 Bm
. (19)
Of special interest are processes with no inputs and pro-
cesses with no outputs, depicted respectively as
P
,
E
. (20)
The former is viewed as a preparation procedure and the
latter is viewed as an effect, corresponding to some out-
come of some measurement. We depict the probability
rule by a map p, as
E
P
p
= Pr(E,P ) ∈ [0, 1]. (21)
That is, the application of p on any closed diagram yields
a real number between 0 and 1. Note that this is not
a diagram-preserving map as it can only be applied to
processes with no input and no output. (Nonetheless, we
will see shortly how it has a diagram-preserving extension
to arbitrary processes—namely, the quotienting map).
This probability rule must be compatible with certain
relations that hold between procedures. First, it must
factorise over separated diagrams, for example,
E1
P1
p
P2
E2
=
E1
P1
p
E2
P2
p
(22)
= Pr(E1, P1) Pr(E2, P2). (23)
Moreover, if T1 is a procedure that is a mixture of T2 and
T3 with weights ω and 1− ω respectively2, then it must
hold that for any tester τ , we have
T1 τ
p
= ω T2 τ
p
+ (1− ω) T3 τ
p
(24)
2 That is, either T2 or T3 is implemented, as determined by the
outcome of a weighted coin-flip.
7Additionally, if one operational effect E1 is the coarse-
graining of two others, E2 and E3, then Pr(E1, P ) must
be the sum of Pr(E2, P ) and Pr(E3, P ) for all P .
We say that an operational theory is tomographically
local if the following property holds:
∀E1, E2, P1, P2 T
E1 E2
p
P1 P2
= T ′
E1 E2
p
P1 P2
⇐⇒
∀E,P T
E
p
P
= T ′
E
p
P
. (25)
In other words, any two processes T and T ′ that give the
same statistics for all local preparations on their inputs
and all local measurements on their outputs also give the
same statistics in arbitrary circuits.
Two processes with the same input systems and out-
put systems are said to be operationally equivalent if they
give rise to the same probabilities no matter what closed
diagram they are embedded in. The testers introduced
in Eq. (5) facilitate a convenient diagrammatic represen-
tation of this condition. That is, two processes are oper-
ationally equivalent, denoted by
T T ′'
A A
B B
(26)
if they assign equal probabilities to every tester, so that
∀τ T τ
p
T ′ τ
p
= . (27)
It is easy to see that operational equivalence defines
an equivalence relation. Hence, we can divide the space
of processes into equivalence classes, and each process T
in the operational theory can be specified by its equiv-
alence class T˜ , together with a label cT of the context
of T , specifying which element of the equivalence class it
is. For a given T , cT provides all the information which
defines that process which is not relevant to its equiva-
lence class. Hence, each procedure is specified by a tuple,
T := (T˜ , cT ), and we will denote it as such when conve-
nient. In the case of closed diagrams, the equivalence
class can be uniquely specified by the probability given
by the map p, and so any information beyond this forms
the context of the closed diagram.
Next, we define a quotienting map ∼ which maps pro-
cedures into their equivalence class; in other words, it
picks out the first element of this tuple, taking (T˜ , cT )→
T˜ . Diagrammatically, we have
(T˜ , cT )
∼
= T˜ .
Hence, on its domain (namely the set of closed diagrams),
the probability rule p is identical to the quotienting map
∼, since every closed diagram is in the equivalence class
of the real number specified by the probability rule. The
diagram-preserving map ∼: Op→ O˜p can therefore be
viewed as a diagram-preserving extension of the proba-
bility rule p. This implies that the quotiented operational
theory reproduces the predictions of the operational the-
ory, since
P˜
E˜
=
P
E
∼
∼
=
P
E
∼
=
P
E
p
= Pr(E,P ). (28)
It is worth noting that in the quotiented operational the-
ory, a closed diagram is equal to a real number (the prob-
ability associated to it), while in the operational theory
these are not equal until the map p is applied to the
closed diagram.
We will assume that every deterministic effect in the
operational theory is operationally equivalent. We de-
note these deterministic effects as:
c
(29)
where c labels the context. An example of two distinct
(but operationally equivalent) deterministic effects in the
operational theory is obtained by either implementing
a measurement M1 and coarse-graining over all its out-
comes, or implementing a measurement M2 and coarse-
graining over all its outcomes.
A. The GPT associated to an operational theory
It turns out that this quotiented operational the-
ory, O˜p, is nothing but a generalized probabilistic the-
ory [34, 35] as we will now demonstrate by proving that
O˜p is tomographic, is representable in Rd (for some d),
is convex, and has a unique deterministic effect. This
is not a novel idea, as it underpins the very definition of
the GPT formalism, at least as presented in [29] and [30].
However, we include it here not as a definition of GPTs,
but rather as a formal relationship between operational
theories as defined in Ref. [39] and the GPT framework.
8Firstly, we show that the quotientied operational the-
ory is tomographic. For a generic process theory, P, be-
ing tomographic means that processes are characterised
by scalars. That is, given any two distinct processes
f, g : A→ B ∈ P,
f 6= g , (30)
there must exist a tester h ∈ P that turns each of these
processes into a closed diagram, i.e., a scalar, such that
the scalars are distinct:
∃h ∈ P : f h 6= g h. (31)
That Eq. (31) implies Eq. (30) is trivial; we now give
the proof that Eq. (30) implies Eq. (31). Consider two
distinct processes in the quotiented operational theory, T˜
and T˜ ′, the images under the quotienting map of process
T and T ′ in the operational theory, such that:
T˜ T˜ ′6=
A A
B B
. (32)
By definition, we know that T˜ 6= T˜ ′ implies that T 6' T ′,
and hence there exists some tester τ such that
T τ
p
T ′ τ
p
6= . (33)
Since the action of p is identical to that of ∼ on closed
diagrams, this implies that
T τ
∼
T ′ τ
∼
6= . (34)
Finally, we can use the fact that the quotienting map is
diagram-preserving to write that there exists τ˜ such that
T˜ τ˜ T˜ ′ τ˜6= . (35)
This establishes that Eq. (30) implies Eq. (31), and so
the quotiented operational theory is tomographic.
We will moreover make the standard assumption of fi-
nite tomography, that for transformations from A → B
there is some set T A→B := {τ˜α}α=1,2,...,mA→B of finite
cardinality mA→B of testers which suffices for tomogra-
phy. Formally, this means that:
T˜ τ˜α T˜ ′ τ˜α6=∃τα ∈ T A→B :⇐⇒T˜ T˜ ′6=
A A
B B
.
(36)
This allows us to define a vector representation of the
operational equivalence classes, where the finiteness as-
sumption above ensures that the associated vector spaces
are finite-dimensional. That is, we represent each process
T˜ with input A and output B as a vector in the vector
space Rm
A→B
, namely, as the vector RT˜ which is defined
componentwise as
[RT˜ ]α := T˜ τ˜α (37)
for α = 1, 2, ...,mA→B . This is clearly an injective map-
ping as, due to finite tomography, we know that each pro-
cess T˜ is uniquely characterised by this set of real num-
bers. Moreover, this mapping provides a linear structure
to the set of processes with input A and output B. For
example, we can write equations such as
RT˜ =
∑
i
riRT˜i (38)
where ri ∈ R.
Consider now how the sequential composition of pro-
cesses is represented. Given representations of a pair
of processes (RT˜ ,RT˜ ′) we know (as R is injective) that
we can determine T˜ and T˜ ′, compute their composition
T˜ ′ ◦ T˜ , and via Eq. (37) obtain RT˜ ′◦T˜ . We denote the
sequential composition map on the vector representation
as RT˜ ′RT˜ := RT˜ ′◦T˜ . Similarly, for parallel composi-
tion we can define RT˜ ′RT˜ := RT˜ ′⊗T˜ . As we prove in
Appendix A, both  and  induce bilinear maps on the
relevant vector spaces. Specifically, we have:
Lemma III.1. The operation  induces a bilinear map
 :
(
Rm
B→C
,Rm
A→B)→ RmA→C , (39)
and the operation  induces a bilinear map
 :
(
Rm
A→B
,Rm
C→D)→ RmAC→BD . (40)
This implies that transformations act linearly on the
state space, and also that the summation operation dis-
tributes over diagrams, i.e.:
RT˜∑
i riRT˜i RT˜ ′
=
∑
i
ri
RT˜
RT˜i RT˜ ′
. (41)
9It is generally easier to work with this vector represen-
tation of processes rather than directly with the abstract
process theory of operational equivalence classes of proce-
dures. We will do so when convenient, abusing notation
by dropping the explicit symbol R, and simply denot-
ing the vector representation of the equivalence classes
in the same way as the equivalence classes themselves.
That is, we will denote RT˜ by T˜ . For example, we will
write Eq. (38) as
T˜ =
∑
i
riT˜i (42)
and Eq. (41) as
T˜∑
i riT˜i T˜
′
=
∑
i
ri
T˜
T˜i T˜ ′
. (43)
Note that generic linear combinations such as
∑
i riT˜i
need not correspond to any process in the operational
theory. However, some linear combinations correspond to
mixtures and coarse-grainings, and these will correspond
to other processes in the operational theory. Namely, if
T1 is a procedure that is a mixture of T2 and T3 with
weights ω and 1− ω, then by Eq. (24) it follows that
T1 τ
p
= ω T2 τ
p
+ (1− ω) T3 τ
p
(44)
for all τ , which in turn implies that
T˜1 τ˜ = ω T˜2 τ˜ + (1− ω) T˜3 τ˜ , (45)
and so by tomography
T˜1 = ωT˜2 + (1− ω)T˜3. (46)
Hence, the mixing relations between preparation proce-
dures in the operational theory are captured by a convex
structure in this representation. More generally we find
that
∀τ T τ
p
=
∑
i
ri Ti τ
p
⇐⇒ T˜ =
∑
i
riT˜i
(47)
for arbitrary coefficients ri. Hence, for example, the
coarse-graining relations that hold among operational ef-
fects are captured by the linear structure in this repre-
sentation of the quotiented operational theory.
If one makes the standard assumption that every pos-
sible mixture of processes in the operational theory is
another process in the operational theory, then it follows
that the quotiented operational theory is convex.
Finally, the fact that we assumed that there was a
unique equivalence class of deterministic effects means
that the quotiented operational theory will have a unique
deterministic effect [29]:
:=
∼
c
. (48)
In summary, a quotiented operational theory satisfies
the key properties of a generalized probabilistic theory:
tomography, representability in Rd (for some d), convex-
ity, and uniqueness of the deterministic effect. Hence-
forth, we will refer to the quotiented operational theory
as the GPT associated to the operational theory.
For example, quantum theory qua operational theory
is the process theory whose processes are laboratory pro-
cedures (including contexts), while quantum theory qua
GPT is the process theory whose processes are com-
pletely positive [40, 41] trace-nonincreasing maps, whose
states are density operators, and so on. When one quo-
tients quantum theory qua operational theory, one ob-
tains quantum theory qua GPT.
B. Tomographic locality of a GPT
Tomographic locality is a common assumption in the
GPT literature—indeed, in some early work on GPTs it
was considered such a basic principle that it was taken as
part of the framework itself [35]. Intuitively, it states that
processes can be characterized by local state preparations
and local measurements. In this section, we will show
that all tomographically local GPTs can be represented
as subtheories O˜p ⊂ RLinear, using arguments similar
to those in, e.g., the duotensor formalism developed by
Hardy [30].
A GPT is said to satisfy tomographic locality if one can
determine the identity of any process by local operations
on each of its inputs and outputs:
∀E˜, E˜′, P˜ , P˜ ′ T˜
E˜ E˜′
P˜ P˜ ′
= T˜ ′
E˜ E˜′
P˜ P˜ ′
⇐⇒
T˜ = T˜ ′ . (49)
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It is clear that an operational theory is tomographically
local if and only if the GPT obtained by quotienting rela-
tive to operational equivalences is tomographically local.
There are many equivalent characterizations of tomo-
graphic locality for a GPT. The most useful for us is
the following condition, first introduced in Sections 6.8
and 9.3 of [30], which allows us to show that tomograph-
ically local GPTs can be represented as subtheories of
RLinear.
Consider an arbitrary set of linearly independent and
spanning states {P˜Aj }j=1,2,...,mA on system A and an ar-
bitrary set of linearly independent and spanning effects
{E˜Bi }i=1,2,...,mB on system B. (If the systems are com-
posite, these should moreover be chosen as product states
and product effects respectively.) Define the ‘transition
matrix’ in this basis for a process T˜ from system A to
system B as
[NT˜ ]
k
j :=
E˜Bk
T˜
B
P˜Aj
A
. (50)
Lemma III.2. A GPT is tomographically local if and
only if one can decompose the identity process, denoted
1˜A, for every system A as
A
=
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
E˜Ai
A
A
P˜Aj
, (51)
where M1˜A is the matrix inverse of the transition matrix
N1˜A of the identity process, that is,
M1˜A := N
−1
1˜A
. (52)
The proof is given in Appendix B.
The vector space spanned by the set {P˜Aj }j=1,2,...,mA
of states is Rm
A
, and the vector space spanned by the set
{E˜Bi }i=1,2,...,mB of effects is Rm
B
. Note that in general,
E˜Aj ◦ P˜Ai 6= δij3, which generically implies that M1˜A is
not the identity matrix (nor is it equal to N1˜A), counter
to intuitions one might have from working with orthonor-
mal bases. The following corollary then makes explicit
3 This fails to be an equality whenever the spanning effects Ei
do not perfectly distinguish the spanning states Pj . Note that
this will be the generic case, as it is only in a simplicial GPT
that there is a spanning set of states which can be perfectly
distinguished.
some extra structure which was implicit in the vector rep-
resentation RT˜ of the previous section. In particular, it
shows that the vector space Rm
A→B
of transformations
from A to B is isomorphic to the vector space of linear
maps from Rm
A → RmB , where a process T˜ is repre-
sented as a vector RT˜ in the former and a matrix MT˜ in
the latter.
Corollary III.3. A GPT is tomographically local if and
only if one can decompose any process T˜ as
T˜
B
A
=
∑
ij
[MT˜ ]
j
i
E˜Ai
A
B
P˜Bj
, (53)
where MT˜ = M1˜B ◦NT˜ ◦M1˜A .
Proof. To prove that a GPT is tomographically local if
one can decompose any process as in Eq. (53), simply
note that for the special case of T˜ = 1˜A, Eq. (53) im-
plies Eq. (51), and hence, by Lemma III.2, implies tomo-
graphic locality.
To prove the converse, we assume tomographic local-
ity and apply Lemma III.2 to decompose the input and
output systems of an arbitrary process T˜ as
T˜
B
A
=
E˜Bk
T˜
P˜Aj∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
∑
kl
[M1˜B ]
l
k
P˜Bl
E˜Ai
= ∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
∑
kl
[M1˜B ]
l
k
P˜Bl
E˜Ai
[NT˜ ]
k
j
(54)
which can be rewritten as:
T˜
B
A
=
∑
il
∑
jk
[M1˜B ]
l
k[NT˜ ]
k
j [M1˜A ]
j
i
 P˜Bl
E˜Ai
(55)
=
∑
il
[M1˜B ◦NT˜ ◦M1˜A ]li
P˜Bl
E˜Ai
(56)
at which point we can simply identify MT˜ = M1˜B ◦NT˜ ◦
M1˜A , giving the desired result.
Given the vector representation of two equivalence
classes, RT˜ and RT˜ ′ , we showed how to compute the
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representation of either the sequential or parallel com-
position of these (via  and , respectively). However, if
we represent equivalence classes by matrices MT˜ instead,
then how must we represent the parallel and sequential
composition of processes? It turns out that parallel com-
position is represented by
MT˜⊗T˜ ′ = MT˜ ⊗MT˜ ′ (57)
where the ⊗ on the left represents the parallel composi-
tion of equivalence classes, while on the right it represents
the tensor product of the two matrices. Meanwhile, the
sequential composition of this matrix representation is
given by
MT˜ ′◦T˜ ′ = MT˜ ′ ◦N1˜B ◦MT˜ (58)
where on the left-hand side ◦ represents the sequential
composition of the equivalence classes, while on the right-
hand side it represents matrix multiplication. These two
facts are proven in Appendix C.
The fact that Eq. (58) is not simply the sequential
composition rule for RLinear, namely the matrix prod-
uct of MT˜ ′ and MT˜ , implies that this matrix representa-
tion is not a subtheory of RLinear, nor even some other
diagram-preserving representation of the GPT. This form
of composition has, however, appeared numerous times
in the literature, for example in Refs. [3, 30, 32, 42].
There is, moreover, a well known trick to turn this rep-
resentation into a diagram-preserving representation in
RLinear: one simply defines a new matrix represen-
tation by replacing MT˜ with MT˜ ◦ N1˜A4. It is then
easy to verify that these do indeed compose using the
standard composition rules (tensor products for paral-
lel composition and matrix multiplication for sequential
composition), and to verify that the identity process is
represented by the identity matrix.
Putting all of this together we arrive at the following.
Theorem III.4. Any tomographically local GPT has a
diagram-preserving representation in RLinear given by
the map
A 7→ RmA
on systems and the map
T˜ 7→MT˜ ◦N1˜A
on processes, where
[NT˜ ]
k
j :=
E˜Bk
T˜
B
P˜Aj
A
(59)
4 In the language of duotensors [30] this means that we put the
duotensors into standard form.
and
MT˜ := N
−1
1˜B
◦NT˜ ◦N−11˜A . (60)
Effectively this means that we can view any tomo-
graphically local GPT simply as a suitably defined sub-
theory O˜p ⊂ RLinear. For the remainder of this paper
we restrict our attention to tomographically local GPTs,
and we will moreover abuse notation and simply denote
the linear maps in this representation by T˜ rather than
by MT˜ ◦N1˜A , and similarly, the vector spaces as A rather
than by Rm
A
. That is, we will neglect to make the dis-
tinction between the quotiented operational theory and
its representation as a subtheory of RLinear, as preserv-
ing the distinction is unwieldy and typically unhelpful.
Quantum theory is an example of a tomographically lo-
cal operational theory, and it is well known that the GPT
representation of quantum theory is similarly tomograph-
ically local. The latter is a subtheory of RLinear, as
B(H) is a real vector space and completely positive trace
non-increasing maps are just a particular class of linear
maps between these vector spaces. Classical theory, the
Spekkens toy model [43], and the stabilizer subtheory [44]
for arbitrary dimensions are also tomographically local.
Examples of GPTs which are not tomographically local
are real quantum theory [45] and the real stabilizer sub-
theory.
IV. REPRESENTATIONS OF OPERATIONAL
THEORIES AND GPTS
One often wishes to find alternative representations of
an operational theory or a GPT, e.g., as an ontologi-
cal model or a quasiprobabilistic model (to be defined
shortly). A key motivation for studying ontological mod-
els is the attempt to find an explanation for the statis-
tics in terms of some underlying properties of the rele-
vant systems, especially if this explanation can be said
to be classical in some well-motivated sense. In this sec-
tion, we introduce the definition of ontological models
and quasiprobabilistic models, and in the next section
we discuss under what conditions one can say that such
representations provide a classical explanation of the op-
erational theory or GPT which they describe.
A. Ontological models
An ontological model is a map associating to every
system S a set ΛS of ontic states, and associating to
every process a stochastic map from the ontic state space
associated to the input systems to the ontic state space
associated with the output systems.
It is important to distinguish between ontological mod-
els of operational theories and ontological models of
GPTs, as was shown in Ref. [6].
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Definition IV.1 (Ontological models of operational the-
ories). An ontological model of an operational theory Op
is a diagram-preserving map ξ : Op→ SubStoch , de-
picted as
ξ :: T
A
B
7→ T
RΛA
A
B
RΛB
ξ
,
from the operational theory to the process theory
SubStoch, where the map satisfies three properties:
1. It represents all deterministic effects in the opera-
tional theory appropriately:
RΛA
A
ξ
c =
RΛA
= 1.
2. It reproduces the operational predictions of the op-
erational theory. That is, for all closed diagrams:
P
E
ξ
=
P
E
∼
= Pr(E,P ).
3. It preserves the convex and coarse-graining rela-
tions between operational procedures. E.g., if T1
is a procedure that is a mixture of T2 and T3 with
weights ω and 1−ω, respectively, then it must hold
that
T1
ξ
= ω T2
ξ
+ (1− ω) T3
ξ
. (61)
This diagrammatic definition of an ontological model
reproduces the usual notions [1] of ontological represen-
tations of preparation procedures and of operational ef-
fects. In particular, an operational preparation proce-
dure is an operational process with a trivial input, and
by diagram preservation of ξ, this is mapped to a process
in SubStoch with a trivial input, that is, to a prob-
ability distribution over the ontic states: P 7→ ξ(P ) :
Λ→ R+ s.t. ∑λ ξ(P )(λ) = 1. Similarly, an operational
effect is an operational process with a trivial output,
and by diagram preservation of ξ is mapped to a sub-
stochastic process with a trivial output, that is, to a re-
sponse function over the ontic states: E 7→ ξ(E) : Λ →
[0, 1] s.t. ξ(E)(λ) ≤ 1.
Definition IV.2 (Ontological models of GPTs). An on-
tological model ξ˜ of a GPT O˜p is a diagram-preserving
map ξ˜ : O˜p→ SubStoch , depicted as
ξ˜ :: T˜
A
B
7→ T˜
ΛA
A
B
ΛB
ξ˜
,
from the GPT to the process theory SubStoch, where
the map satisfies three properties:
1. It represents the deterministic effect appropriately:
RΛA
A
ξ˜
=
RΛA
= 1.
2. It reproduces the operational predictions of the
GPT, so that for all closed diagrams,
P˜
E˜
ξ˜
=
P˜
E˜
= Pr(E˜, P˜ ). (62)
3. It preserves the convex and coarse-graining rela-
tions between operational procedures. E.g., if
T˜1 = ω T˜2 + (1− ω) T˜3 (63)
then it must hold that
T˜1
ξ˜
= ω T˜2
ξ˜
+ (1− ω) T˜3
ξ˜
. (64)
In analogy with the discussion above, one has that nor-
malized GPT states on some system are represented in
an ontological model by probability distributions over the
ontic state space associated with that system, while GPT
effects are represented by response functions.
The state spaces in SubStoch form simplices, and so
we will sometimes refer to an ontological model of a GPT
as a simplex embedding. This terminology is a natural
extension of the definition of simplex embedding in [6].
13
B. Quasiprobabilistic models
We now introduce quasiprobabilistic models of a GPT.
One could analogously define quasiprobabilistic models
of an operational theory (as diagram-preserving maps
from Op to QuasiSubStoch). However, given that the
expressive freedom offered by the possibility of context-
dependence is sufficient to ensure that every operational
theory admits of an ontological model, and hence a pos-
itive quasiprobabilistic model, there is no need to make
use of the additional expressive freedom offered by allow-
ing negative quasiprobabilities, and hence no motivation
to introduce such models. On the other hand, in the
case of GPTs, there does not always exist an ontologi-
cal model, hence quasiprobabilistic models are a useful
conceptual and mathematical tool for assessing the clas-
sicality of a GPT.
Definition IV.3 (Quasiprobabilistic models of GPTs).
A quasiprobabilistic model of a GPT O˜p, is a diagram-
preserving map ξˆ : O˜p→ QuasiSubStoch , depicted as
ξˆ :: T˜
A
B
7→ T˜
ΛA
A
B
ΛB
ξˆ
,
where the map satisfies three properties:
1. It represents the deterministic effect appropriately:
RΛA
A
ξˆ
=
RΛA
= 1. (65)
2. It reproduces the operational predictions of the
GPT, so that for all closed diagrams,
P˜
E˜
ξˆ
=
P˜
E˜
= Pr(E˜, P˜ ).
3. It preserves the convex and coarse-graining rela-
tions between operational procedures. E.g., if
T˜1 = ω T˜2 + (1− ω) T˜3 (66)
then it must hold that
T˜1
ξˆ
= ω T˜2
ξˆ
+ (1− ω) T˜3
ξˆ
. (67)
One can see that the only technical distinction between
an ontological model of a GPT and a quasiprobabilistic
model of a GPT is that in the latter, the probabilities
are replaced by quasiprobabilities, which are allowed to
go negative.
In analogy with the discussion at the end of Sec-
tion IV A, one has that GPT states on some system are
represented in a quasiprobabilistic model by quasidistri-
butions over the ontic state space associated with that
system, that is, functions on Λ normalised to 1 but where
the values can be negative, while GPT effects are repre-
sented by arbitrary real-valued functions over the ontic
state space.
V. THREE EQUIVALENT NOTIONS OF
CLASSICALITY
Every operational theory admits of some ontological
model, if one does not restrict attention to ontological
models satisfying additional properties. However, only
those ontological models that do satisfy additional as-
sumptions constitute good explanations. One such prin-
ciple is that of (generalized) noncontextuality [1]. It was
argued in Refs. [1, 2, 6, 46] that an ontological model of
an operational theory should be deemed a good classical
explanation only if it is noncontextual. We now provide
the definition of a noncontextual ontological model in the
framework we have introduced here.
Definition V.1 (A noncontextual ontological model of
an operational theory). An ontological model of an oper-
ational theory ξnc : Op→ SubStoch satisfies the prin-
ciple of generalized noncontextuality if and only if every
two operationally equivalent procedures in the operational
theory are mapped to the same substochastic map in the
ontological model. That is, if
T ' T ′ =⇒ T
ΛA
A
B
ΛB
ξnc
= T ′
ΛA
A
B
ΛB
ξnc
. (68)
Another way of stating this condition is that the map
ξnc does not depend functionally on the context of any
processes in the operational theory, so that for all T :=
(T˜ , cT ) one has ξnc(T ) = ξnc(T˜ ).
As pointed out in Ref. [6], ontological models of
GPTs, unlike those of operational theories, cannot be
said to be either generalized-contextual or generalized-
noncontextual. This is because there is no notion of a
context in a GPT on which the ontological representa-
tion could conceivably depend.5 However, Ref. [6] showed
5 Accordingly the Beltrametti-Bujaski model [47] constitutes a
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(in the context of prepare-and-measure scenarios) that
the principle of noncontextuality nonetheless induces a
notion of classicality within the framework of GPTs:
namely, the GPT is said to have a classical explanation if
and only if it admits of an ontological model. (Unlike for
operational theories, not all GPTs admit of an ontologi-
cal model. This is a consequence of the representational
inflexibility resulting from the lack of contexts on which
the representation might depend.) We now extend this
result (Theorem 1 of Ref. [6]) from prepare-and-measure
scenarios to arbitrary scenarios.
Theorem V.2. There is a one-to-one correspondance
between noncontextual ontological models of an oper-
ational theory, ξnc : Op→ SubStoch , and ontological
models of the associated GPT, ξ˜ : O˜p→ SubStoch .
Proof sketch. The idea of the proof is captured by the
following diagram:
Op O˜p
SubStoch
∼
ξnc
ξ˜
C
,
where C is defined as a map which takes any process
T˜ in the GPT O˜p to some process T = (T˜ , cT ) in the
operational theory. There always exists at least one such
map C (in general, there exist many), and all of these
satisfy ∼ ◦C = Id (in general, no choice of C will satisfy
C ◦ ∼ = Id).
Now, consider an operational theory Op and the GPT
O˜p it defines.
Given an ontological model ξ˜ of O˜p, one can define a
noncontextual model ξnc of Op via ξnc := ξ˜ ◦∼. The map
constructed in this manner cannot depend on the con-
texts of processes in the operational theory, since these
are removed by the quotienting map ∼. As such, the map
ξnc necessarily satisfies Eq. (68), and hence is indeed non-
contextual.
Given a noncontextual ontological model ξnc of Op, one
can define an ontological model ξ˜ of O˜p via ξ˜ := ξnc ◦ C.
Because the map ξnc does not depend on the context, the
map constructed in this manner does not depend on the
choice of C, and is unique.
For completeness, we prove in Appendix D that ξnc :=
ξ˜ ◦ ∼ indeed satisfies the relevant constraints to be an
ontological model of an operational theory, and similarly,
that ξ˜ := ξnc ◦C satisfies the relevant constraints to be a
valid ontological model of a GPT.
(contextual) ontological model of the single qubit subtheory only
when the latter is viewed as an operational theory rather than
as a GPT. Similarly, the 8-state model of Ref. [48] constitutes a
(contextual) ontological model of the stabilizer qubit subtheory
only when it is viewed as an operational theory rather than as a
GPT, since in both cases, the representation of a given quantum
process depends on the particular realization of that process.
Finally, we note that this notion of classicality of a
GPT is closely linked to the positivity of quasiprobabilis-
tic models. This result can be seen as an extension of the
equivalence in Ref. [2] from the prepare-and-measure sce-
nario to arbitrary compositional scenarios.
Definition V.3 (Positive quasiprobabilistic model of
a tomographically local GPT). A positive quasiproba-
bilistic model of a tomographically local GPT O˜p is a
quasiprobabilistic model ξˆ+ : O˜p→ QuasiSubStoch in
which all of the matrix elements of the quasisubstochastic
maps in the image of ξˆ+ are positive, that is, if and only
if all of the quasisubstochastic maps in the image of ξˆ+
are substochastic.
Simply by examining the definitions, it is
clear that a positive quasiprobabilistic model
ξˆ+ : O˜p→ QuasiSubStoch of a GPT is equiva-
lent to an ontological model ξ˜ : O˜p→ SubStoch of
that GPT. It follows that:
Proposition V.4. There exists a positive quasiproba-
bilistic model of a GPT O˜p if and only if there exists an
ontological model of O˜p.
Putting Thm. V.2 and Prop. V.4 together, one has
that:
Corollary V.5 (Three equivalent notions of classical-
ity). Let Op be an operational theory and O˜p the GPT
obtained from Op by quotienting. Then, the following are
equivalent:
(i) There exists a noncontextual ontological model of Op,
that is, a map ξnc : Op→ SubStoch .
(ii) There exists an ontological model (a.k.a. simplex
embedding) of O˜p, that is, a map ξ˜ : O˜p→ SubStoch .
(iii) There exists a positive quasiprobabilistic model of
O˜p, that is, a map ξˆ+ : O˜p→ QuasiSubStoch .
This generalizes the results of Refs. [2, 6, 7] from
prepare-measure scenarios to arbitrary compositional
scenarios.
VI. STRUCTURE THEOREM
With this framework in place, we can prove our main
results. We start with a general theorem, leveraging the
fact that O˜p ⊂ RLinear, as stated in Theorem III.4. We
then specialize to the various physically relevant cases.
Theorem VI.1. Any convex-linear, empirically
adequate and diagram-preserving map (eq. (8)),
M : O˜p→ RLinear , where O˜p is tomographically
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local can be represented as
T˜
M
VA
A
B
VB
= T˜
χB
χ−1A
VA
A
B
VB
, (69)
where for each system A, χA : A → VA is an invertible
linear map within RLinear.
Note that we have colored the linear maps χA to make
it immediately apparent that they came from the associ-
ated diagram-preserving map.
The proof consists of three main arguments, provided
explicitly in Appendix E and sketched here.
First, we leverage tomographic locality of the GPT, as
well as convex-linearity and diagram preservation of the
map, to prove that one can represent the action of the
map on a generic process in terms of its action on states
and effects
T˜
M
VA
A
B
VB
=
M
∑
ij
rij
E˜j
P˜i
VB
VA
=
∑
ij
rij
M
E˜j
P˜i
M
VB
VA
. (70)
Second, using convex-linearity of the map, we prove
that one can represent the action of M on states and
effects simply as some linear maps within RLinear; that
is,
P˜i
M
VB
B
=
P˜i
χB
VB
and
E˜j
M
VA
A =
E˜j
φA
VA
. (71)
Finally, we leverage empirical adequacy and the rep-
resentation of the identity (a consequence of diagram
preservation) to prove that these two linear maps are
inverses of each other; that is,
VA
=
χA
φA
VA
VA
A and
A
=
χA
φA
A
VA
A
. (72)
This shows that the only freedom in the representa-
tion is in representation of the states, via the choice of
linear maps χS , of the theory; after specifying these, one
can uniquely extend to the representation of arbitrary
processes.
One key consequence of this result is the follow-
ing corollary, whose significance we investigate in Sec-
tion VI C.
Corollary VI.2. The dimension of the codomain, VA of
the map χA is given by the dimension of the GPT vector
space A.
Proof. The linear map χA is invertible, so the dimension
of its domain and of its codomain must be equal, and its
domain is the GPT state space.
Note that the proof of the structure theorem and this
subsequent corollary do not require the full generality of
diagram preservation, only the (mathematically) much
weaker conditions that:
M
= ,
M
E˜j
P˜i
=
M
E˜j
P˜i
M
, and
E˜
P˜
M
=
E˜
P˜
M
M
.
(73)
We will give justifications of these (for the case of onto-
logical models and quasiprobabilistic models) in Sec. VII,
and will discuss further consequences of general diagram
preservation in Sec. VI D.
A. Diagram-preserving quasiprobabilistic models
are exact frame representations
As mentioned in the introduction, SubStoch and
QuasiSubStoch are subprocess theories of RLinear,
SubStoch ⊂ QuasiSubStoch ⊂ RLinear. This im-
plies that our main theorem applies to these special cases.
The fact that the codomain is restricted can then equiv-
alently be expressed as a constraint on the linear maps
χA. In the case of quasiprobabilistic representations we
obtain:
Proposition VI.3. Any diagram-preserving quasiproba-
bilistic model of a tomographically local GPT can be writ-
ten as
T˜
ξˆ
RΛA
A
B
RΛB
= T˜
χB
χ−1A
RΛA
A
B
RΛB
(74)
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for invertible linear maps {χS : S → RΛS} within
RLinear for each system, where these satisfy
χS = . (75)
Proof. Since ξˆ satisfies the requirements of Theorem VI.1
we immediately obtain Eq. (74). For the particular case
of the deterministic effect, we have that
ξˆ
= χ−1S . (76)
Recall that, by definition, a quasiprobabilistic model sat-
isfies Eq. (65):
ξˆ
= . (77)
Combining these gives
= χ−1S . (78)
Composing both sides of this with χS gives Eq. (75).
The extra constraint of Eq. (75) is not part of the gen-
eral structure theorem because an abstract vector space
does not have a natural notion of discarding. Such a priv-
ileged notion is found within, for example, SubStoch, as
the all ones covector, which represents marginalization.6
Since the χS are just invertible linear maps, this map
can be seen as merely transforming from one represen-
tation of the GPT to another. Critically, however, one
must note that the vector spaces in QuasiSubStoch are
all of the form RΛ, and so they come equipped with ex-
tra structure—namely, a preferred basis and dual basis.
Hence, these representations are effectively singling out
this preferred basis for the GPT.
To see this more explicitly, denote the preferred basis
and cobasis for RΛ as:{
λ
RΛ
}
λ∈Λ
and
{
λ
RΛ
}
λ∈Λ
respectively.
(79)
6 Even within vector spaces with an associated physical interpreta-
tion of vectors as processes, there is not always a unique discard-
ing map; for example, in the vector space of quantum channels,
applying the channel to any fixed input state and tracing the
output constitutes a discarding operation.
which, in particular, means we can decompose identities
as
=
∑
λ∈Λ λ
λ
. (80)
This means that, for any system A in the GPT, we can
write χA as:
χA =
∑
λ∈ΛA
χA
λ
λ
=:
∑
λ∈ΛA D˜Aλ
λ
, (81)
As χA is invertible, then {D˜Aλ }λ∈ΛA is a cobasis for the
GPT:  D˜Aλ

λ∈ΛA
, (82)
whereby condition (75) becomes
∑
λ∈ΛA
D˜Aλ = . (83)
Similarly, we could run the same argument using χ−1A
to single out a basis, {F˜Aλ }λ∈ΛA for the GPT: F˜Aλ

λ∈ΛA
. (84)
Moreover, this decomposition, together with reversibility
of χA means that
∑
λ,λ′∈ΛA
D˜Aλ′
F˜Aλ
λ′
λ
=
χ−1A
χA
=
=
∑
λ,λ′∈ΛA
δλλ′
λ′
λ
, (85)
and hence
F˜Aλ
D˜Aλ′
= δλλ′ . (86)
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That is, {F˜Aλ }λ defines a basis of VA and {D˜Aλ′}λ′ defines
a dual basis of V ∗A.
We can then represent the action of ξˆ as:
T˜
ξˆ
RΛA
A
B
RΛB
=
∑
λ∈ΛA,λ′∈ΛB
T˜
D˜Bλ′
F˜Aλ
λ′
λ
RΛA
RΛB
(87)
which can be viewed as a quasistochastic map defined by
the conditional quasiprobability distribution
ξˆ(T˜ )(λ′|λ) = T˜
D˜Bλ′
F˜Aλ
. (88)
1. Diagram-preserving quasiprobabilistic models of quantum
theory
We now consider the case of quantum theory as a GPT.
The basis {F˜λ}λ∈Λ is a basis for the real vector space
of Hermitian operators for the system while the cobasis,
{D˜λ}λ∈Λ is a basis for the space of linear functionals on
the vector space of Hermitian operators. The Riesz repre-
sentation theorem [49] guarantees that every element D˜λ
of the cobasis can be represented via the Hilbert-Schmidt
inner product with some Hermitian operator, which we
will denote as D˜∗λ, such that for all ρ:
ρ
D˜λ′
= D˜λ ◦ ρ = tr(D˜∗λρ). (89)
The condition in Eq. (83) is then
∑
λ D˜
∗
λ = 1, and the
condition of Eq. (86) is simply
tr(D˜∗λ′ F˜λ) = δλλ′ . (90)
It is clear, therefore, that {F˜λ}λ and {D˜∗λ}λ constitute a
minimal frame and its dual (in the language of, for exam-
ple, Refs. [3]). Hence, this representation is nothing but
an exact frame representation, that is, one which is not
overcomplete. That is, a transformation T˜ , represented
by a completely positive trace preserving map ET˜ , will
be represented as a quasistochastic map defined by the
conditional quasiprobability distribution:
ξˆ(T˜ )(λ′|λ) = tr(D˜∗λ′ET˜ (F˜λ)) (91)
It is easy to see that any set of spanning and linearly
independent vectors summing to identity will define a
suitable dual frame {D˜∗λ}, and then the frame {F˜λ} itself
is uniquely defined by Eq. (90). (Note in particular that
the elements of the frame need not be pairwise orthogo-
nal, nor must those of the dual frame.)
It has previously been shown that all quasiprobabilistic
models of quantum theory are frame representations [3].
What we learn here is that diagram-preserving quasiprob-
abilistic models are necessarily the simplest possible
frame representations, namely those that are not over-
complete.
B. Structure theorems for ontological models
In the case of ontological models of a GPT, we obtain:
Proposition VI.4. Any diagram-preserving ontological
model of a tomographically local GPT can be written as
T˜
ξ˜
RΛA
A
B
RΛB
= T˜
χB
χ−1A
RΛA
A
B
RΛB
, (92)
where
χA = (93)
and where moreover every pair (χ−1A , χB) defines a posi-
tive map from the cone of transformations from A to B
in the GPT O˜p to the cone of substochastic maps from
ΛA to ΛB in SubStoch.
The proof is given in Appendix F. Apart from positiv-
ity, the proof follows immediately from Proposition VI.3.
One can interpret this map from the GPT to the onto-
logical model as an explicit embedding into a simplicial
GPT as discussed in [6], but generalized to the case in
which both the GPT under consideration and the sim-
plicial GPT have arbitrary processes, not just states and
effects. This follows from the positivity conditions, em-
pirical adequacy, and the preservation of the determinis-
tic effect.
As in the case of quasiprobabilistic models, we can
write out χA as:
χA =
∑
λ∈ΛA D˜Aλ
λ
, (94)
where {D˜Aλ }λ forms a basis for the vector space of the
GPT defined by the operational theory. The positiv-
ity condition for χA discussed above immediately implies
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that D˜Aλ is a linear functional which is positive on the
state cone, and the normalization condition immediately
implies that their sum over λ is the deterministic effect.
By a similar argument, each F˜Aλ is a vector in the vector
space of states which is positive on all GPT effects.
In the case of a GPT which satisfies the no-restriction
hypothesis [29] (e.g. quantum and classical theory), this
means that the D˜Aλ are effects (forming a measurement)
and that the F˜Aλ are states. In the quantum case, the
notion of positivity that we have expressed here reduces
to positivity of the eigenvalues of the Hermitian opera-
tors. This provides another immediate proof that quan-
tum theory, as a GPT, does not admit an ontological
model—it would require an exact frame and dual frame
for the space of Hermitian operators which are all posi-
tive, but it is known that such a basis and dual do not
exist [3].
We have shown (Theorem V.2) that every noncontex-
tual ontological model of an operational theory is equiv-
alent to an ontological model of the GPT defined by
the operational theory. Combining this with proposi-
tion VI.4, it immediately follows that:
Corollary VI.5. Any noncontextual ontological model
of a tomographically local operational theory can be writ-
ten as
T˜
ξnc
RΛB
RΛA
B
A
= T˜
∼
ξ˜
RΛB
RΛA
= T˜
χB
χ−1A
∼
RΛB
RΛA
for
χA
RΛA
A
=
∑
λ∈ΛA D˜Aλ
λ
RΛA
A
,
where {D˜Aλ }λ forms a basis for the vector space of the
GPT defined by the operational theory.
Previously noncontextual ontological representations
seemed to be a highly flexible concept, but this corol-
lary demonstrates that they in fact have a very rigid
structure. Every noncontextual ontological model can
be constructed in two steps: i) quotient to the associ-
ated GPT, ii) pick a basis for the GPT such that it is
manifestly an ontological model. Furthermore, the only
freedom in the representation is in representation of the
states in the theory (via this choice of basis); after speci-
fying this, one can uniquely extend to the representation
of arbitrary processes.
C. Consequences of the dimension bound
In Corollary VI.2 we showed that any noncontextual
ontological model of a tomographically local theory must
have the same number of ontic states as the dimension
of the GPT state space. In the language of Hardy [37],
this exactly means that the “ontological excess baggage
factor” γ must be exactly 1 that is: demanding non-
contextuality rules out ontological excess baggage. Since
Hardy showed that all ontological models of a qubit must
in fact have unbounded excess baggage, his result can im-
mediately be combined with ours to give a new proof that
the full statistics of processes on a qubit do not admit a
noncontextual model.
Our result implies that a diagram-preserving noncon-
textual ontological model of a qubit can have at most 4
ontic states. This extends to any tomographically com-
plete subtheory of a qubit, such as the stabilizer sub-
theory. The stabilizer case is extremely restrictive; e.g.,
it immediately guarantees that the 8-state model [48]
is contextual; indeed, the 8-state model was previously
shown to be a contextual model by a different argu-
ment which proved transformation contextuality for the
model [20].
Furthermore, our bound improves an algorithm first
proposed in Ref. [6]. In particular, Ref. [6] gave an algo-
rithm for determining if a GPT admits of an ontological
model by testing whether or not the GPT embeds in a
simplicial GPT of arbitrary dimension. The lack of a
bound on this dimension means that there is no guar-
antee that the algorithm will ever terminate. Ref. [50]
solves this problem by providing such a bound, namely,
the square of the given GPT’s dimension. Our result
strengthens this bound, reducing it to the given GPT’s
dimension. In fact, our bound is tight, as there can never
be an embedding of the GPT into a lower dimensional
space. These results simplify the algorithm dramatically:
rather than testing for embedding in a sequence of sim-
plicial GPTs of increasing dimension, one can simply per-
form a single test for embedding in a simplicial GPT of
the same dimension as the given GPT.
D. Diagram preservation implies ontic separability
Returning to representations of a GPT by some
M : O˜p→ RLinear satisfying the conditions of
Thm. VI.1, we can derive constraints coming from dia-
gram preservation beyond the three particular instances
which we used in proving Thm. VI.1. In particular, by
considering parallel composition we obtain the following:
Proposition VI.6. Via diagram preservation, parallel
composition implies an additional constraint on the linear
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maps, χA, namely,
χAB
A⊗B
VA ⊗ VB
= χAB
A B
VA VB
= χA χB
A B
VA VB
. (95)
Proof. Recall that for any system S, one has
P˜
χS
S
VS
= P˜
M
VS
S
. (96)
Hence if we apply χAB to a product state we have
P˜
χAB
P˜ ′
=
P˜ P˜ ′
M
. (97)
Since M is diagram-preserving, we have
P˜ P˜ ′
M
=
P˜ P˜ ′
MM
. (98)
Recalling the definition of χS again, we conclude that
P˜
χAB
P˜ ′
=
P˜
χA
P˜ ′
χB . (99)
In a locally tomographic GPT, the product states span
the entire state space, and so this implies Eq. (95).
Now, if we consider the case of quasiprobabilistic repre-
sentations, ξˆ : O˜p→ QuasiSubStoch , we obtain that:
χAB
RΛAB
A⊗B
= χA
RΛA
A
χB
RΛB
B
. (100)
Given Eq. (81), this is equivalent to
∑
λ∈ΛAB D˜ABλ
λ
RΛAB
A⊗B
=
∑
λ′∈ΛA,λ′′∈ΛB D˜Aλ′
λ′
RΛA
A
D˜Bλ′′
λ′′
RΛB
B
.
(101)
That is, diagram preservation implies that the frame rep-
resentation must factorize across subsystems. In other
words, the vector basis defining the frame representation
must be a product basis.7
We can also note that this means that RΛAB = RΛA ⊗
RΛB which in turn means that ΛAB = ΛA×ΛB . That is,
the sample space of a composite system is the Cartesian
product of the sample spaces of the components.8
This constraint has particular significance
if we consider the case of ontological models,
ξ˜ : O˜p→ SubStoch , as this means that for an
ontological model, the ontic state space of a composite
system is the Cartesian product of the ontic state
spaces of the components. We term the latter ontic
separability [39, 51]. It is a species of reductionism,
asserting, in effect, that composite systems have no
holistic properties. More precisely, the property ascrip-
tions to composite systems are all and only the property
ascriptions to their components. Yet another way of
expressing the condition is that the properties of the
whole supervene on the properties of the parts.
The assumption of ontic separability for ontological
models has been discussed in many prior works [39, 51],
and has been a substantive assumption in certain argu-
ments. For instance, in Ref. [52], ontic separability was
used to demonstrate that in a noncontextual ontological
model, all and only projective measurements are repre-
sented outcome-deterministically.
It is also worth noting that the assumption of prepara-
tion independence in the PBR theorem [53] follows from
diagram preservation (e.g. Eq. 99). This connection be-
tween PBR and preservation of compositional structure
has been previously explored in Sec. 4 of [33], in which
they use this connection to derive a categorical version
of the PBR theorem.
E. Converses to structure theorems
In the above section we showed how all diagram-
preserving quasiprobabilistic and ontological representa-
tions must have a particularly simple form given by a
collection of invertible linear maps {χA} satisfying cer-
tain constraints. We now prove what is essentially the
converse to each of these results.
7 This can be seen as a more restrictive version of Thm. (11) in [32]
where we consider strict monoidal rather than strong monoidal
functors.
8 This result can also be seen as an immediate consequence of dia-
gram preservation for composite systems (rather than processes).
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Consider defining a map from O˜p to RLinear by
T˜
A
B
7→ T˜
χB
χ−1A
VA
A
B
VB
. (102)
Under what conditions on the set {χA} is a quasiproba-
bilistic, or an ontological representation?
To ensure that Eq. (102) defines a diagram preserving
map one must simply impose that:
χAB
A B
VA VB
= χA χB
A B
VA VB
. (103)
This condition, together with invertibility and linearity
of the χA, easily imply that diagram preservation and
indeed all the assumptions of Theorem VI.1 are satisfied.
To ensure that Eq. (102) defines a linear representation
that is moreover a quasiprobabilistic representation, as in
Def. IV.3, one must impose that VA = R
ΛA and that
χA
A
RΛA
=
A
, (104)
which implies that the conditions in Def. IV.3 are satis-
fied.
Finally, to ensure that Eq. (102) defines a quasiprob-
abilistic representation that is moreover an ontological
representation, as in Def. IV.2, one must introduce a posi-
tivity constraint for this map. Specifically, one must have
that
χB
χ−1A
RΛA
A
B
RΛB
:: T˜
A
B
7→ T˜
χB
χ−1A
RΛA
A
B
RΛB
(105)
defines a positive map from the cone of transformations
from A to B in O˜p to the cone of stochastic maps from
ΛA to ΛB .
This provides a simple recipe for constructing linear
representations: one simply needs to choose a family of
invertible linear maps for each system which cannot de-
compose into subsystems, and then define the others as
the tensor product of these (so that general χA factorise
over subsystems). Similarly, it provides a simple recipe
for constructing quasiprobabilistic representations, using
the same construction but where the χA preserve the
deterministic effect. In the case of noncontextual onto-
logical models, however, the recipe is less simple: one
must not only choose invertible linear maps which fac-
torise over subsystems and preserve the deterministic ef-
fect, but must also check the positivity condition (which
is nontrivial, since for any particular map χA, one must
check the condition for every χB).
VII. REVISITING OUR ASSUMPTIONS
We have derived surprisingly strong constraints on the
form of noncontextual ontological models of operational
theories, and so it is important to examine the assump-
tions that went into deriving these constraints. These
concerned both the types of operational theories under
consideration and the types of ontological representations
of these, and were summarized in Section I A. The major-
ity of these are ubiquitous and well-motivated. The only
notable restriction on the scope of operational theories we
consider is the one induced by our assumption of tomo-
graphic locality (as discussed further in Section VII B).
Similarly, the only notable restriction on ontological (and
quasiprobabilistic) models that is warranting of further
discussion is that they are diagram-preserving.
A. Revisiting diagram preservation
In the case of ontological models, we will provide be-
low a motivation for the instances of diagram preserva-
tion that we required for our proofs. Since we have de-
fined quasiprobabilistic models as representations of op-
erational theories wherein the only difference from an on-
tological model is that the probabilities are allowed to be-
come quasiprobabilities (i.e., drawn from the reals rather
than the interval [0, 1]), it follows that these same motiva-
tions are also applicable to them. It is worth noting that
among the quasiprobabilistic representations for contin-
uous variable quantum systems that are most studied in
the literature, the Wigner representation satisfies our def-
inition9 while the Q [54] and P representations [55, 56] do
not (as they are defined by overcomplete frames). There
are also examples of both types among quasiprobabilistic
representations of finite-dimensional systems in quantum
theory. Gross [57] has proposed a discrete Wigner rep-
resentation based on a discrete symplectic group. For
n d-dimensional systems, he notes that one can define
two different discrete Wigner representations: the first
considers the discrete symplectic group defined for each
d-level system and the second considers the one defined
9 Strictly speaking, one would need to generalize our definition to
the case of infinite-dimensional GPTs.
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for the full dn-dimensional system. Only the first corre-
sponds to a frame representation that factorizes across
systems and fits our definition, Notably, the representa-
tions which have found the most widespread use (espe-
cially in the study of negativity in quasiprobability rep-
resentations as a resource for information processing) are
the ones that fit our definition.
Although we endorse diagram preservation in its most
general form, it is worth noting that our main results
(given in Section VI) require only the following very spe-
cific instances of that assumption:
(i) diagram preservation for prepare-measure scenar-
ios,
ξ˜ ::
E˜
P˜
7→
E˜
P˜
ξ˜
ξ˜
. (106)
and diagram preservation for measure and repre-
pare processes
ξ˜ ::
E˜
P˜
7→
ξ˜
E˜
P˜
ξ˜
, (107)
(ii) diagram preservation for the identity process
ξ˜ ::
A
7→
ΛA
. (108)
These are easily justified.
Eq. (106) captures the idea that the ontic state is the
complete causal mediary between the preparation and
the effect. This assumption is built into the very defini-
tion of the standard ontological models framework [39],
and is explicitly assumed in virtually every past work on
ontological models.
Eq. (107) is a similarly natural assumption. The nat-
ural view of the process
E˜
P˜
(109)
is that one has observed effect E˜ and then one has inde-
pendently implemented the preparation P˜ . There need
not be any system acting as a causal mediary between
E˜ and P˜ . The natural ontological representation, there-
fore, is one wherein there is no ontic state mediating the
two processes, as depicted in Eq. (107). Although we are
not aware of this assumption having been made in pre-
vious works, it is directly analogous to the preparation-
independence assumption made in Ref. [53] (which in-
volved two independent states, rather than an indepen-
dent effect and state).
Eq. (108) can be justified by noting that within the
equivalence class of procedures associated to the identity
operation in the GPT, there is the one which corresponds
to waiting for a vanishing amount of time. In any reason-
able physical theory, no evolution is possible in vanishing
time, and hence the only valid ontological representation
of such an equivalence class of procedures is the identity
map on the ontic state space.
Because we consider the full assumption of diagram
preservation to be a natural generalization of all of these
specific assumptions, we have endorsed it in our defini-
tions. A defense of this stronger assumption will be given
in Ref. [31].
B. Necessity of local tomography
The assumption of local tomography is common in the
GPT literature, so we will not attempt a defense of it
here. Nevertheless, it is natural to ask if the assump-
tion is actually necessary to obtain our structure theo-
rems. Here we provide an example which shows that it is.
The operational theory we consider in our example is the
real-amplitude version of the qutrit stabilizer subtheory
of quantum theory. In this subtheory, two systems are
described by 45 parameters, whereas only 62 = 36 pa-
rameters are available from local measurements, which
immediately implies that the theory is not locally to-
mographic (just as the real-amplitude version of the full
quantum theory fails to be locally tomographic [45]).
To begin with, consider the standard (complex-
amplitude) qutrit stabilizer subtheory. Gross’s discrete
Wigner function [57] (in particular, the one that fits our
definition) provides a quasiprobability representation for
qutrits for which the stabilizer subtheory is positively
represented. By Corollary V.5, this corresponds to a non-
contextual ontological model of the subtheory. Indeed,
this ontological model has been examined in Ref. [58],
where it is shown that it can be reconstructed from an
“epistemic restriction”. Since the standard qutrit stabi-
lizer subtheory is locally tomographic, these models obey
our structure theorems. In particular, the representation
of n qubits uses 9n ontic states, matching the dimension
of the relevant space of density matrices.
Now consider the subtheory consisting of only those
qutrit stabilizer procedures that can be represented using
real amplitudes. This does not introduce any new oper-
ational equivalences, and so the model discussed above
is still noncontextual when restricted to this subtheory.
But now our structure theorem does not hold, because
this model still uses 9n ontic states even though the den-
sity matrices now live in a 123
n(3n+1)-dimensional space.
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VIII. OUTLOOK
These results can be directly applied to the study of
contextuality in specific scenarios and theories. For in-
stance, we have already seen that our dimension bound
is a useful tool for obtaining novel proofs of contextual-
ity (e.g., via Hardy’s ontological excess baggage theorem
[37] or for the 8-state model), and for providing novel
algorithms (which are more noise-robust than previous
methods, as argued in Ref. [6]). It remains to be seen
whether other algorithms for witnessing nonclassicality,
such as those in Ref. [59] or Ref [60], could be extended
within our framework to more general compositional sce-
narios.
Our formalism is also ideally suited to understanding
the information-theoretic advantages afforded by con-
textual operational theories, such as for computational
speedup, since it has the compositional flexibility to de-
scribe arbitrary scenarios, such as families of circuits
which arise in the gate-based model of computation. In
fact, our structure theorem is a major first step in sim-
plifying the proof that contextuality is the resource pow-
ering the state-injection model of quantum computing.
Such a proof would proceed by strengthening our struc-
ture theorem to show that the frame (and the dual frame)
must be composed of a set of Weyl operators, show-
ing that the only positive quasiprobabilistic models of
the classically-simulable stabilizer subtheory for prime di-
mensions are given by the family of Gross’ Wigner func-
tions; then, the known fact that the injected resource
states in the model are represented negatively would es-
tablish the result in a direct and elegant fashion.
The key limitation of our results is the assumption that
the operational theory, or equivalently, the associated
GPT, is tomographically local. There are two poten-
tial approaches to dealing with this limitation. On the
one hand, one could provide an argument that theories
which are not tomographically local are undesirable in
some principled sense. For example, it seems likely that
one can rule them out using Leibniz’s principle [8]. From
a practical perspective, wherein the goal is to experi-
mentally verify nonclassicality in a theory-independent
manner, one would instead be motivated to seek exper-
imental evidence that nature truly satisfies tomographic
locality, independent of the validity of quantum theory.
One possible approach to this end would be to further
develop the techniques introduced in [61] to composite
systems.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma III.1
We now prove Lemma III.1, restated here:
Lemma A.1. The operation  induces a bilinear map
 :
(
Rm
B→C
,Rm
A→B)→ RmA→C , (A1)
and the operation  induces a bilinear map
 :
(
Rm
A→B
,Rm
C→D)→ RmAC→BD . (A2)
Proof. We will only prove linearity of  in the second argument, as the rest of the proof is analogous.
Consider the case that
RT˜ =
∑
i
riRT˜i , (A3)
which by Eq. (47) means that for all τ˜ ,
T˜ τ˜ T˜i τ˜=
∑
i ri . (A4)
Now, define
τ˜ ′ :=
T˜ ′
τ˜ (A5)
for some arbitrary τ˜ and transformation T˜ ′. Substituting tester τ˜ ′ into Eq. (A4) we find that
T˜ ′
T˜
τ˜ =
∑
i
ri
T˜ ′
T˜i
τ˜ . (A6)
As this holds for all τ˜ , tomography implies that
RT˜ ′◦T˜ =
∑
i
riRT˜ ′◦T˜i (A7)
Using the fact that RT˜ ′◦T˜ = RT˜ ′RT˜ and similarly that RT˜ ′◦T˜i = RT˜ ′RT˜i we find that:
RT˜ ′RT˜ =
∑
i
ri
(
RT˜ ′RT˜i
)
(A8)
and hence, by substituting Eq. (A3) on the LHS, one has
RT˜ ′
(∑
i
riRT˜i
)
=
∑
i
ri(RT˜ ′RT˜i) (A9)
This proves that  is linear in the second argument.
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Appendix B: Proof of Lemma III.2
We now prove Lemma III.2, restated here:
Lemma B.1. A GPT is tomographically local if and only if one can decompose the identity process for every system
A, denoted 1˜A, as
A
=
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
E˜Ai
A
A
P˜Aj
, (B1)
where M1˜A is the matrix inverse of the transition matrix N1˜A of the identity process, that is,
M1˜A := N
−1
1˜A
. (B2)
Proof. First, we prove that if a GPT satisfies local tomography, then the identity has a decomposition of the form in
Eq. (B1). We do this by defining a particular process f as a linear expansion into states and effects with the carefully
chosen set of coefficients [M1˜A ]
j
i , and then we prove that f = 1˜A.
Take any minimal spanning set {P˜Ai }i of GPT states and spanning set {E˜Aj }j of GPT effects, and consider the
transition matrix N1˜A with entries given by
[N1˜A ]
j
i :=
P˜Ai
E˜Aj
. (B3)
Next, define M−1
1˜A
:= N1˜A , that is the inverse
10 N1˜A with matrix elements [M1˜A ]
j
i satisfying∑
j
[M1˜A ]
j
i [N1˜A ]
k
j = δik, (B4)
and define a process f as
f :=
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
E˜Ai
P˜Aj
. (B5)
10 The matrix inverse of N1˜A exists, since the rows of N1˜A are linearly independent, as we now prove by contradiction. Suppose there
were a linear dependence, given by a nontrivial set of {ai}i such that
∑
i ai[N1˜A ]
j
i = 0. Then, one could multiply each side of Eq. (B3)
by ai and sum over i, obtaining 0 =
∑
i ai[N1˜A ]
j
i =
∑
i ai
P˜Ai
E˜Aj
. Since this holds for all effects E˜j in a spanning set, it also holds for an
arbitrary effect E˜, so that 0 =
∑
i ai
P˜Ai
E˜
. But by the principle of tomography, this gives
∑
i aiP˜
A
i = 0, contradicting the claim that
the set of GPT states were linearly independent.
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A priori, there is no reason why this process must be a physical GPT process; however, it turns out to be the identity
process, as we will now show. Consider the expression
P˜Ak
f
E˜Al
(B6)
for some P˜Ak and some E˜
A
l from the minimal spanning sets above. Substituting the expansion of f followed by
applying the definition of M1˜A and N1˜A , one has
P˜Ak
f
E˜Al
=
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
P˜Ak
E˜Ai
P˜Aj
E˜Al
=
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i [N1˜A ]
l
j [N1˜A ]
i
k. (B7)
But now it follows from Eq. (B4) that
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i [N1˜A ]
l
j [N1˜A ]
i
k =
∑
i
δil[N1˜A ]
i
k = [N1˜A ]
l
k =
P˜Ak
E˜Al
. (B8)
Hence, it holds that
P˜Ak
f
E˜Al
=
P˜Ak
E˜Al
(B9)
for all P˜Ak and E˜
A
l in the minimal spanning sets above. By the fact that these sets span the state and effect spaces
respectively, it follows that
P˜
f
E˜
=
P˜
E˜
(B10)
for all P˜ and E˜. Now, in any GPT which satisfies local tomography, namely Eq. (49), two channels which give the
same statistics on all local inputs and outputs are equal, and hence f is in fact the identity transformation. Hence,
the identity transformation has a linear expansion, of the form given by Eq. (B1), namely
f = =
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
E˜Ai
P˜Aj
. (B11)
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Next, we prove the converse: if the identity has a linear expansion as in Eq. (B1) in a given GPT, then that GPT
satisfies tomographic locality. To see this, consider two bipartite processes T˜ and T˜ ′ which give rise to the same
statistics on all local inputs, so that
∀P1, P2, E1, E2 T˜
E˜1 E˜2
P˜1 P˜2
A
B
C
D
= T˜ ′
E˜1 E˜2
P˜1 P˜2
A
B
C
D
. (B12)
For any tester τ˜ of the appropriate type, one can write the probability generated by composing with T˜ as
T˜τ˜
A
B
C
D
=
∑
ijkli′j′k′l′
[M1˜A ]
i′
i [M1˜C ]
j′
j [M1˜B ]
k′
k [M1˜D ]
l′
l T˜
E˜Bk E˜
D
l
P˜Ai′ P˜
C
j′
E˜Ai E˜
C
j
P˜Bk′ P˜
D
l′
τ˜ (B13)
simply by inserting the linear expansion of the identity on each system. Similarly, one can write
T˜ ′τ˜
A
B
C
D
=
∑
ijkli′j′k′l′
[M1˜A ]
i′
i [M1˜C ]
j′
j [M1˜B ]
k′
k [M1˜D ]
l′
l T˜ ′
E˜Bk E˜
D
l
P˜Ai′ P˜
C
j′
E˜Ai E˜
C
j
P˜Bk′ P˜
D
l′
τ˜ . (B14)
Noting that the RHS of Eq. (B13) splits into two disconnected diagrams, and the same holds for the RHS of Eq. (B14),
it follows from Eq. (B12) that
T˜τ˜ = T˜ ′τ˜ . (B15)
Since this is true for any two processes satisfying Eq. (B12), the principle of local tomography (Eq. (49)) is satisfied.
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Appendix C: Proof of Eqs. (57) and (58)
To prove Eq. (57), one can decompose the four identities in the diagram and perform some simple manipulations
of the resulting expression.
T˜
B
A
T˜ ′
D
C
=
E˜Bk
T˜
P˜Aj∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
∑
kl
[M1˜B ]
l
k
P˜Bl
E˜Ai
E˜Dk′
T˜ ′
P˜Cj′∑
i′j′
[M1˜C ]
j′
i′
∑
k′l′
[M1˜D ]
l′
k′
P˜Dl′
E˜Ci′
= ∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
∑
kl
[M1˜B ]
l
k
P˜Bl
E˜Ai
[NT˜ ]
k
j ∑
i′j′
[M1˜C ]
j′
i′
∑
k′l′
[M1˜D ]
l′
k′
P˜Dl′
E˜Ci′
[NT˜ ′ ]
k′
j′ (C1)
=
∑
ii′ll′
 ∑
jj′kk′
[M1˜B ]
l
k[NT˜ ]
k
j [M1˜A ]
j
i [M1˜D ]
l′
k′ [NT˜ ′ ]
k′
j′ [M1˜C ]
j′
i′
 P˜Bl
E˜Ai
P˜Dl′
E˜Ci′
(C2)
=
∑
ii′ll′
(
[M1˜B ◦NT˜ ◦M1˜A ]li[M1˜D ◦NT˜ ′ ◦M1˜C ]l
′
i′
) P˜Bl
E˜Ai
P˜Dl′
E˜Ci′
(C3)
=
∑
ii′ll′
(
[(M1˜B ◦NT˜ ◦M1˜A)⊗ (M1˜D ◦NT˜ ′ ◦M1˜C )]ll
′
ii′
) P˜Bl
E˜Ai
P˜Dl′
E˜Ci′
(C4)
=
∑
ii′ll′
(
[MT˜ ⊗MT˜ ′ ]ll
′
ii′
) P˜Bl
E˜Ai
P˜Dl′
E˜Ci′
. (C5)
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To prove Eq. (58), one can insert four decompositions of the identity into the following diagram:
T˜
T˜ ′
A
B
C
=
P˜Bn
T˜ ′
E˜Co
T˜
E˜Bk
P˜Aj
P˜Bl
E˜Bm
E˜Ai
P˜Cp
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
∑
kl
[M1˜B ]
l
k
∑
mn
[M1˜B ]
n
m
∑
op
[M1˜C ]
p
o
=
E˜Ai
P˜Cp
∑
ij
[M1˜A ]
j
i
∑
kl
[M1˜B ]
l
k
∑
mn
[M1˜B ]
n
m
∑
op
[M1˜C ]
p
o
[N1˜]
m
l
[NT˜ ′ ]
o
n
[NT˜ ]
k
j
(C6)
=
∑
ip
[M1˜C ◦NT˜ ′ ◦M1˜B ◦N1˜B ◦M1˜B ◦NT˜ ◦M1˜A ]oi
E˜Ai
P˜Cp
(C7)
=
∑
ip
[MT˜ ′ ◦N1˜B ◦MT˜ ]oi
E˜Ai
P˜Cp
. (C8)
Appendix D: Completing the proof of Theorem V.2
The key argument required to establish Theorem V.2 was given just after the theorem itself, but we now complete
the proof.
We now prove that ξnc := ξ˜◦ ∼ is indeed a valid ontological model of an operational theory if ξ˜ is a valid ontological
model of a GPT. To do so, we show that each of the three properties (enumerated in Definition IV.1) that ξnc should
satisfy is implied by the corresponding property (enumerated in Definition IV.2) that ξ˜ is assumed to satisfy by virtue
of being an ontological model of a GPT.
First, recall that we assumed that all deterministic effects in the operational theory are operationally equivalent.
Hence, the map ∼ will take any such deterministic effect to the unique deterministic effect in the GPT, which (by
property 1 of Definition IV.2) must be represented by the unit vector 1. Hence, ξnc represents all deterministic effects
in the operational theory appropriately, namely as the unit vector 1.
Second, recall that ∼ preserves the operational predictions of the operational theory; hence, the fact that (by
property 2 of Definition IV.2) ξ˜ preserves the operational predictions of the GPT implies that ξnc := ξ˜◦ ∼ preserves
the operational predictions of the operational theory.
Third, recall that if, in the operational theory, P1 is a procedure that is a mixture of P2 and P3 with weights ω and
1− ω, then it follows that under ∼, one has
P˜1 = ωP˜2 + (1− ω)P˜3. (D1)
30
Hence, the fact that (by property 3 of Definition IV.2) the representations of these three processes under ξ˜ satisfy
P˜1
ξ˜
= ω P˜2
ξ˜
+ (1− ω) P˜3
ξ˜
(D2)
implies that the representations of P1, P2, and P3 satisfy
P1
ξnc
= ω P2
ξnc
+ (1− ω) P3
ξnc
. (D3)
Hence ξnc satisfies all the properties of an ontological model of an operational theory.
Conversely, we prove that ξ˜ := ξnc◦C is a valid ontological model of a GPT if ξnc is a valid noncontextual ontological
model of an operational theory. To do so, we show that each of the three properties (enumerated in Definition IV.2)
that ξ˜ should satisfy is implied by the corresponding property (enumerated in Definition IV.1) that ξnc is assumed to
satisfy by virtue of being an ontological model of a GPT.
First, consider the unique deterministic effect in the GPT. Applying C to this process yields one of the many
deterministic effects in the operational theory. Because (by property 1 of Definition IV.1) ξnc maps every one of these
to the unit vector 1, it follows that ξ˜ := ξnc ◦ C maps the unique deterministic effect to the unit vector 1.
Second, recall that the context of a process is irrelevant for the operational predictions it makes, and that conse-
quently, the map C preserves the operational predictions. Given that (by property 2 of Definition IV.1) ξnc preserves
the operational predictions, ξ˜ := ξnc ◦ C also preserves the operational predictions.
Third, consider three processes P˜1, P˜2, and P˜3 such that P˜1 = ωP˜2 + (1 − ω)P˜3 in the GPT. Under C, one has
processes C(P˜1) = (P˜1, c1), C(P˜2) = (P˜1, c2), and C(P˜3) = (P˜1, c3) in the operational theory, where ci are arbitrary
contexts specified by the map C. The fact that P˜1 = ωP˜2 +(1−ω)P˜3 implies that C(P˜1) is operationally equivalent to
the effective procedure Pmix defined as the mixture of C(P˜2) and C(P˜3) with weights ω and 1−ω, respectively. (C(P˜1)
may not actually be this mixture, depending on its context ci, which depends on one’s choice of C.) By property 3 of
Definition IV.1, ξnc must satisfy
Pmix
ξnc
= ω C(P˜2)
ξnc
+ (1− ω) C(P˜3)
ξnc
. (D4)
But since ξnc is a noncontextual model and since C(P˜1) is operationally equivalent to Pmix, it follows that
C(P˜1)
ξnc
= ω C(P˜2)
ξnc
+ (1− ω) C(P˜3)
ξnc
. (D5)
Hence we see that ξ˜ := ξnc ◦ C satisfies property 3 of Definition IV.2, as required.
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem VI.1
We now complete the proof of Theorem VI.1, as sketched in the main text.
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Proof. Since we are assuming local tomography of the GPT, Corollary III.3 immediately gives
T˜
M
VA
A
B
VB
=
M
∑
ij
rij
E˜j
P˜i
VB
VA
. (E1)
Since M is convex-linear, and the effect-state channels span the vector space, it can be uniquely extended to a linear
map Mˆ , and so
M
∑
ij
rij
E˜j
P˜i
VB
VA
=
Mˆ
∑
ij
rij
E˜j
P˜i
. (E2)
Now, using the linearity of Mˆ , we have
Mˆ
∑
ij
rij
E˜j
P˜i
=
∑
ij
rij
Mˆ
E˜j
P˜i
. (E3)
Noting that in this diagram, Mˆ is only applied to objects in the domain of M , on which the two maps act identically
(by the fact that the former is the linear extension of the latter), one has
∑
ij
rij
Mˆ
E˜j
P˜i
=
∑
ij
rij
M
E˜j
P˜i
=
∑
ij
rij
M
E˜j
P˜i
M
VB
VA
. (E4)
where the last step follows from the fact that M is diagram-preserving. In summary, we have shown that
T˜
M
VA
A
B
VB
=
∑
ij
rij
M
E˜j
P˜i
M
VB
VA
, (E5)
as claimed in Eq. (70).
Next, we analyse M in the specific case of a state ρi:
P˜i
M
VB
. (E6)
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Since the DP map M is linear and takes the vector space of GPT states to the vector space Rn, and since both of
these are in RLinear, one can re-interpret the action of M as a process χ within RLinear:
P˜i
M
VB
=
P˜i
χB . (E7)
Similarly, M on effects σj is linear and takes functionals on GPT states to functionals on Rn; in other words, M is
the adjoint of a process φ within RLinear:
E˜j
M
VA
A =
E˜j
φA
VA
, . (E8)
Combining this with Eq. (E5), we have
T˜
M
=
χB
φA
∑
ij
rij
E˜j
P˜i
= T˜
χA
φB
. (E9)
All that remains is to show that χA and φA are inverses. Consider the special case that E is the identity, then
Eq. (E9) becomes
M
=
χA
φA
. (E10)
Since M is diagram-preserving, it maps identity to identity, and so this becomes
=
χA
φA
. (E11)
Now consider a state P˜ followed by an effect E˜. This gives a probability, and since M is empirically adequate it
must preserve this probability:
E˜
P˜
=
E˜
P˜
M
, (E12)
and since M is diagram-preserving,
E˜
P˜
M
=
E˜
P˜
M
M
. (E13)
Combining this with Eqs. (E7) and (E8) gives
E˜
P˜
=
E˜
P˜
χA
φA
. (E14)
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Since this holds for all E˜ and P˜ , local tomography implies that
A
=
χA
φA
A
VA
A
. (E15)
Combining this with Eq. (E11) gives that χ and φ are inverses of each other.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition VI.4
Proof. Since the ontological model ξ˜ satisfies the requirements of Proposition VI.3 we immediately obtain Eqs. (92)
and (93).
We however also obtain additional constraints arising from the fact that the codomain of ξ˜ is SubStoch rather than
QuasiSubStoch. This additional constraint can be viewed as a set of positivity conditions as we will now explain.
The notion of positivity we require is defined for linear maps between ordered vector spaces. Given two ordered
vector spaces where the ordering is defined by a positive cone, (V, V +) and (W,W+), maps between these ordered
vector spaces are linear maps on the underlying vector spaces L : V → W and are said to be positive if and only if
L(V +) ⊆W+.
Now, the question is: what are the relevant ordered vector spaces which we want to consider here? In the GPT,
O˜p, we can define an ordered vector space for each pair of systems (A,B) as the vector space spanned by the
transformations from A to B, which we denote by Span[O˜p
B
A ]. The positive cone is defined by the vectors in this space
which can be expressed as a positive linear combination of vectors in O˜p
B
A , that is, of the form
∑
i rif˜i where ri ∈ R+
and f˜i ∈ O˜pBA . Similarly, in SubStoch we can defined an ordered vector space for each pair of systems (RΛ,RΛ
′
) as
the vector space spanned by the substochastic maps from RΛ to RΛ
′
, which we denote by Span[SubStochΛ
′
Λ ]. The
positive cone is defined by the vectors in this space which can be expressed as a positive linear combination of vectors
in SubStochΛ
′
Λ , that is, of the form
∑
i risi where ri ∈ R+ and si ∈ SubStochΛ
′
Λ .
Next, for a pair of GPT systems (A,B) the action of the map ξ˜ from O˜p
B
A to SubStoch
ΛB
ΛA
can be extended to a
linear map from Span[O˜p
B
A ] to Span[SubStoch
ΛB
ΛA
]. Moreover, it is clear that this will be a positive linear map—in the
sense that we defined above—as it maps the positive cone in Span[O˜p
B
A ] into the positive cone in Span[SubStoch
ΛB
ΛA
].
This positivity condition is all fairly abstract so let us consider some more concrete consequences of this result.
If, rather than considering transformations from one GPT system to another, we consider just the states of a single
system A then everything simplifies considerably. The vector space we consider in the domain is simply the vector
space spanned by the GPT state space, and the positive cone is then just the standard cone of GPT states. The
vector space we consider in the codomain is simply the vector space RΛA with positive cone given by the cone of
unnormalised probability distributions. Moreover, the linearly extended action of ξ˜ is nothing but the linear map χA
so we find that χA must be a positive map in the sense defined above.
Similarly, if we consider the contravariant action of χ−1A on the space of GPT effects (that is, by composing the
effect onto the outgoing wire of χ−1A ) then we arrive at a similar result. Here we find that the contravariant action
of χ−1A is a positive linear map from the dual of the GPT vector space ordered by the effect cone to the dual of R
ΛA
ordered by the cone of response functions.
